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THE TRANSFORMATION OF REFORMED NATURAL 
LAW DOCTRINE IN SAMUEL RUTHERFORD’S LEX, 
REX
In addition to Rutherford’s emphasis on core ideas of Reformed thought concerning God’s 
ordination of civil government for His glory and equating divine law with natural law, he grounds 
both natural law and the limits to political authority in a covenant of creation between God and 
man. Flowing from these ideas, Rutherford distinguishes between the institution of the office 
(political government), and the designation of a person or persons to the office. A most important 
perspective emanating from Rutherford’s covenantal natural law theory is his distinction between 
ends and means on secondary causation in the subject’s involvement in political life. This essay 
investigates some of the implications flowing from Rutherford’s transformation of Reformed 
natural law doctrine.
Key terms: covenant, Lex, Rex, natural law, political government, Samuel Rutherford 
Bykomend tot Rutherford se beklemtoning van fundamentele idees van die Reformatoriese denke 
met betrekking tot God se instelling van burgerlike regering tot sy eer en die vereenselwiging 
van goddelike reg met natuurreg, grond hy sowel die natuurreg as die perke van politieke gesag 
in ’n skeppingsverbond tussen God en die mens. Uit hierdie opvattings spruit Rutherford se 
onderskeid tussen die instelling van die owerheidsamp (politieke regering) en die aanwysing 
van ’n persoon of persone in sodanige ampte. ’n Uiters belangrike perspektief wat spruit uit 
Rutherford se verbondsmatige natuurregsteorie is sy onderskeid tussen doelwitte en middele 
met betrekking tot sekondêre oorsaaklikheid in die onderdaan se betrokkenheid in die politieke 
lewe. Hierdie artikel ondersoek sommige van die implikasies van Rutherford se transformasie 
van die Reformatoriese natuurreg-leerstuk.
Sleutelterme: Lex, Rex, natuurreg, politieke regering, Samuel Rutherford, verbond
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1. INTRODUCTION
The polemical treatise Lex, Rex (1644) by Samuel Rutherford, in 
reply to the royalist assertions by John Maxwell, Bishop of Ross, 
in his Sacro-sancta regum majestas (1644), represents a major 
development in reformed political thought up to that time. It 
is a long and detailed work of political theory in justification of 
the Puritan views on law and government. Although primarily 
aimed at refuting the arguments of English and Scottish royalist 
writers, this work proved to be a most influential compendium 
of the core ideas of Reformed politics of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
In addition to Rutherford’s emphasis on principles of Reformed 
thought concerning God’s ordination of civil government for 
His glory and equating divine law with natural law, he grounded 
both natural law and the limits to political authority in a 
covenant of creation between God and man. Flowing from these 
ideas, Rutherford distinguished between the institution of the 
office (political government), and the designation of a person or 
persons to the office. A most important view emanating from 
Rutherford’s covenantal natural law theory is his distinction 
between ends and means, and secondary causation in political 
life. Describing the concept of civil government as founded by 
God and practised by men, Rutherford describes the nature 
of this ordinance with particular reference to monarchy. He 
regards the power of monarchy to be derivative from God, 
while its effectual establishment comes from the people: “The 
question is, Whether the kingly office itself come from God. 
I conceive it is, and floweth from the people ... God ordained 
the power. It is from the people only by a virtual emanation, 
in respect that a community having no government at all 
may ordain a ruler or appoint an aristocracy” (LR, Q 4: 6).1 By 
advancing the idea that government exists only through the 
consent of the community, Rutherford’s covenantal natural 
law theory not only postulates the ground ideas of Reformed 
democracy, but also provides for circumstances and conditions 
under which the subjects may resist civil government, and, 
in extreme circumstances, resume their power. Quoting 
biblical examples, Rutherford regards rulers appointed by the 
people to rule “covenant-wise and conditionally”, according 
to God’s law, “and the people resigning their power to him for 
their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life under him, and 
not to destroy them and tyrannise over them” (LR, Q 14: 57). 
This covenant is presupposed in nature and provides the basis 
for lawful rebellion by the people against unjust government. 
Furthermore, God had not given power to a ruler to govern 
absolutely and above the law: “(t)he law, rather than the ruler, 
hath the power of life and death” (LR, Q 22: 102).
This essay investigates Rutherford’s transforming of Reformed 
political and legal theory by grounding law and government in 
the covenant of creation and the vast implications emanating 
from his perspectives on covenantal natural law and political 
power in a system of democratic governance. Because the 
magisterial Reformers did not deviate seriously from the 
medieval conceptions of natural law and its location in the 
1 All references to Rutherford’s Lex, Rex, quote the abbreviated title, the 
question considered and the page number. 
human mind, it is necessary to consider the medieval legacy on 
natural law and conscience in order to appreciate Rutherford’s 
transformative involvement in Reformed politics and legal 
theory and his lasting contributions to Reformed thought on 
democratic governance. 
2.  THE MEDIEVAL TRADITION OF 
NATURAL LAW
2.1 Natural law and conscience in medieval  
 philosophy
2.1.1  The obligating nature of natural law
Medieval theories of natural law were mostly in agreement that 
natural law is embedded in the deeper recesses of the human 
constitution, that it forms an essential part of being human and 
that it is impressed in human beings by nature. According to St. 
Augustine the eternal law of God is impressed upon the human 
essence (the heart), as the image of a ring passes into the wax 
“without abandoning the ring” (DT, 14, 15).2 This passage 
identifies natural law with eternal law, the former being simply 
a participation of the latter. The fundamental norm of human 
actions is present in human beings by the communication of 
the eternal law. The eternal law, or the reason of God, is the 
eternal plan of divine wisdom by which the whole creation is 
ordered, directed and steered towards its final goal. St. Thomas, 
in his Summa Theologica (1997), clearly states that natural law 
is not different from the eternal law but rather a participation 
in that law (ST, P(I-II), Q(91), A(2)).3 Therefore natural law is 
not some instinct or feeling as some passages might indicate. 
Only human beings (as opposed to animals) share intellectually 
and rationally in the eternal mind, which explains why 
only rational creatures have law and the ability to know law 
(ST, P(I-II), Q(91), A(2)). 
According to Thomistic philosophy, natural law directs the 
activities of human beings by means of certain general precepts 
(or principles), the most fundamental of which is that good is to 
be done and evil avoided. The voice of reason makes it possible 
for human beings to distinguish between morally good and bad 
actions. Those things for which man has a natural inclination 
are good and must be regarded as constituting natural law. 
Firstly, there is the natural human instinct of self-preservation 
of which the law must take cognisance. Secondly, there is the 
attraction between the sexes and the desire to conceive, to rear 
and educate children. Thirdly, human beings have a natural 
desire to know the truth about God, an inclination that drives 
humans to shun ignorance. Fourthly, man is inclined to live in 
society, and it is therefore natural for humans to avoid harming 
those among whom he has to live. Although these basic 
precepts, or principles, of natural law are considered immutable, 
Thomas admits the possibility of changing the secondary 
precepts, in the form of detailed conclusions derived from the 
2  References to St. Augustine’s De Trinitate, are abbreviated as DT, and 
the book and chapter cited. 
3  “The natural law is simply the rational creature’s participation in the 
eternal law.” 
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basic precepts, under certain circumstances. To Thomas there 
is in every human being a natural inclination to act according 
to reason (or virtuously). This implies that irrational, antisocial, 
and criminal acts are to be regarded as deviations from human 
nature, just as the innate instinct of self-preservation may in 
some people be blotted out by an urge to destroy one’s own life. 
The supreme moral law inserted in human beings by nature, 
is the light of reason. Referring to the passage of the Psalmist 
in Psalm 4, Thomas adds that the light of natural reason, by 
which we distinguish good from evil, and which belongs to 
natural law, is simply the impression of divine light in us 
(cf. ST, P(I-II), Q(91), A(2)). The light of reason is truth. 
St. Augustine, after asking how the wicked see the moral rules 
which even they use to reprove evil actions, replies in the book 
of the light called truth which describes every law (DT, 14, 15). 
This truth is described by St. Jerome (c. 340-420) as a “natural 
holiness” impressed on the human soul by God; it resides in the 
highest part of the spirit, where it judges between what is right 
and what is wayward (Rosmini, 1989: 10). The fundamental 
principle of truth placed in the human mind is described by 
St. Ivo of Chartres as the idea of what is right placed in the human 
mind by God, the first truth. Through this idea each human 
being, having only synteresis, differentiates between what is just 
and what is unjust without any teacher, written law or judge; 
with this light God enlightens everyone coming into the world 
(Rosmini, 1989(a): 10). The light of reason is united with the 
human subject and comes to form part of human nature in such 
a way that without it humanity would no longer exist. 
Can natural law, emanating from human nature, impose true 
obligations on human beings? Traditional Thomistic views on 
natural law responded positively to this question. Although 
natural law is not promulgated with external signs and writing, 
it is promulgated through the internal light of reason. The 
obligating force of natural law does not come from reason as 
a human faculty, but from the light inherent in reason by 
nature; a light which takes the form of principles as a result of 
its various applications. Natural law receives its obligating force 
from being divinely impressed on human nature. Therefore 
it obliges without the addition of any other particular light – 
it obliges because truth, the law from the hand of God Himself, 
is written into natural reason. God has impressed in human 
beings the moral rules of life which together form the natural 
law; the natural law obliges us because of its relationship 
with divine nature. Human dictates, therefore, have no force 
without a relationship with the light impressed on us by God. 
Without this light, they are obscure, ambiguous and fallible. 
St. Thomas’ theory of natural law therefore leaves us with the 
following conclusions about the obligating nature of natural 
law: 1. Natural law obliges per se without the addition of any 
special light to the light already impressed in human rational 
nature by God. 2. This law is clear in its principal points, and is 
proposed to human reason. 3. Human beings have a true moral 
obligation in the evident points of natural law. 4. In a state of 
pure nature, free from sin, human beings would have known 
natural law fully and certainly in all its consequences.
  
 
2.1.2 Medieval conceptions of synteresis as the  
 seat of natural law principles
The concept of synteresis surfaced in the writings of the early 
Church Fathers.  St. Hieronymus was the first to reserve the 
term synteresis for that part of the conscience which protects, 
maintains and preserves the divine law in the human person. 
For Hieronymus, synteresis denotes the spark of the conscience 
remaining in the human being after the Fall; it is the spark of 
the conscience providing humans with the basic knowledge of 
what is right and wrong in spite of man’s fall into sin. 
Hieronymus’ theory of synteresis played a constitutive role in 
shaping early medieval views on man’s ability to distinguish 
between good and evil. It is a natural ability which protects, 
maintains and preserves the divine law in the human mind. 
Synteresis is the “spark” of the conscience; it governs the other 
powers of the soul, and protects and preserves the other soul-
powers from erring. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 331-395) followed 
Hieronymus’ views that the synteresis is the apex of the human 
conscience revealing the distinction between good and evil in 
the human mind. Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) also followed 
Hieronymus’ views of synteresis as the seeds (or remnants) of 
man’s original ability to distinguish between good and evil 
(a view supported by Maximus Confessor and St. Augustine) 
(Sum. Th., II, 16, 99). Albertus Magnus regarded the synteresis 
to be the highest moral power (potentia cum habitu completa 
or voluntas rationalis appetens bonum, dissentiens malo) 
(Eisler, 1930 III: 200). As such it is an ability (power) which 
culminates in the habitus (disposition). It is the spark of 
reason murmuring against evil, inclining man to the good and 
testifying against evil; it is a light inclining man to do good 
(Sum. Th., II, 25, 2-3).
St. Basil (c. 329-379) describes synteresis as the natural 
judgement (naturae iudicatorum) in which the demands of the 
natural law (lex naturalis) are inscribed (cf. Sum. Th., II, 25, 2). 
Synteresis is the natural ability to measure human behaviour to 
the standards of the lex naturalis.
Tertullian (c. 160-230) describes synteresis as the remnants of 
the good in all human beings. This ability is essentially the 
natural inclination to distinguish between good and evil, the 
seeds of which remain in the human mind (DA, 41). Tertullian’s 
views were followed by Maximus Confessor and St. Augustine 
(cf. Sum. Th., II, 16, 99).
In Alexander of Hales’ views on conscience a distinction is 
drawn between synteresis and conscience. Synteresis is reserved 
for the unchanging (immutable) rational spirit in the human 
person (the spiritus rationalis hominis in an ethical sense) or 
the light illuminating human reason. To Alexander of Hales, 
synteresis is the spark of the conscience still operative in the 
human mind, whilst conscience is the changing (mutable) part 
(Stoker, 1925: 26-28). In medieval ethical theory, man’s natural 
awareness of moral law became associated with synteresis, the 
scintilla conscientiae (or spark of the mind), which reminds the 
human person of the precepts of the moral law (Stoker, 1925: 
26-28). 
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Although the Medievalists were generally in agreement on the 
synteresis as the natural ability to distinguish between good 
and evil and to know the contents of the natural law precepts, 
theories on synteresis culminated in two distinct philosophical 
approaches: the respective views of Albertus Magnus and 
Thomas Aquinas. Albertus Magnus followed Hieronymus’ 
description of synteresis: it is the highest moral power in the 
form of a potential; it is the spark of reason inclining towards 
the good and testifying against evil. Synteresis is the enduring 
inclination towards the good and functions as a “light” in the 
human mind. 
Different from Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas regarded 
the synteresis not as a potential but as a habitus, the conscience 
being an actus. Synteresis is the law of the intellect containing 
precepts of natural law; it moves humans to do good and to shun 
evil. Different from Hieronymus, Thomas regards synteresis as 
not functioning beyond the other powers of the soul; it is the 
total of moral judgments underlying and implanted naturally in 
the conscience; it affirms the good and shuns evil. To Aquinas, 
synteresis denotes the law in the human intellect, the precepts 
of which form the tenets of the lex naturalis. In distinction 
from synteresis, the basic or original conscience, conscientia 
implies the relation of knowledge to something – conscience 
witnesses, binds, incites, accuses, torments, or rebukes 
(ST, (P(1) Q(79) A(13)). Therefore, conscience is not a power 
but a specific function, namely the application of knowledge 
(ST, P(1) Q(79) A(13)). Conscience, by implication, has the 
function of practical reason (ST, P(1) Q(79) A(13) RO(1)-(2)). 
Conscientia can therefore be described as that which controls 
the spirit and guides the soul as a dictate of reason (ST, P(1) Q(79) 
A(13) RO(1)). It means, in effect, that conscientia is the dictate of 
reason, it incorporates a goal-oriented system of knowledge, 
and it is an act of practical reason in the form of affirmative or 
negative judgments (ST, (P1) Q(79) A(13)). 
The Scholastic views on the nature and role of synteresis 
(in distinction from conscientia) can be summarised as follows: 
synteresis is the spark of the intellect, it is the consciousness of 
the moral law, faintly reminding the human person of good and 
evil; it is the spark of the conscience, the primary conscience 
sometimes called the scintilla conscientiae, which manifests 
itself as a faint murmuring by revealing the precepts of the 
moral law to the human mind.  
3 THE MAGISTERIAL REFORMERS ON 
THE NATURAL ABILITY TO KNOW THE 
NATURAL LAW
3.1  John Calvin on natural law and moral  
 knowledge
Calvin’s views on the human conscience, as the seat of 
natural law precepts, are reflective of most of the views of 
the magisterial Reformers – particularly Luther4 – in their 
4 The following abbreviations are used, together with the relevant 
Scriptural citation where applicable, for citing Luther’s individual 
works in the American edition (Luther, 1958-1967): Sermons on the 
Gospel of St. John (SJ); Temporal authority: to what extent it should be 
following of the classical Thomistic approach to the gleaning 
of knowledge of natural law principles. In most respects Calvin 
followed Luther’s thoughts on natural law, conscience and 
the human ability to know the basic precepts of natural law: 
the ethical norms of human behaviour come to expression 
in the human conscience (WA, 8, 606); the divine moral law 
is a more complete expression of the precepts of natural law 
(WA, 24, 9 & 16, 431); man’s fall into sin did not extinguish the 
“sparks” of reason inherent in the human mind (WA, 10(1), 
203); God originally provided man with outstanding abilities as 
natural endowments (WA, 51(2), 242ff.). 
In Calvin’s works he uses the concepts ius naturae and lex 
naturae interchangeably to denote the concept of natural law. 
To Calvin the lex naturae is the total of practical and ethical 
principles in human nature containing the basic conceptions of 
justice and rightness (Op., 49, 37ff.). Similar to other magisterial 
Reformers Calvin teaches that all human beings – including 
the Pagans – have knowledge of the basic tenets of natural law 
(Op., 49, 37). Following the Stoic conceptions of natural law, 
Calvin maintains that the source of the natural moral law is 
not cosmic nature or the natural order, but human nature (the 
heart or human intellect) (Op., 47, 37). Calvin follows the ancient 
Christian tradition that God had provided human nature with 
the basic knowledge of right and wrong and that man has 
an innate sense of justice and fairness. These fundamental 
concepts of morality and truth are manifested in the human 
intellect. In fact, human beings are equipped with the ability 
to know the basic principles of natural law, the seat of which 
is the conscience or ratio naturalis (Gaius, Institutes, I, I, I, 89). 
Calvin prefers the Pauline term “conscience” for the sense of 
the divine judgment, the inner testimony in the human mind, 
the remnants of the natural ability to discern good from evil 
(Op., 2, 196). The human knowledge of these moral precepts 
manifests itself as seeds (or sperms) of justice implanted in the 
human spirit (Op., 49, 38).
Calvin also applies the term sensus naturae – man’s practical 
perception – to describe the inner human sense of justice and 
order; the sense of moral and aesthetical values from which 
emanates moral judgements in the form of the human legal 
consciousness. Man’s sensus naturae is stirred when the social 
order is threatened, man’s inner sense of right affronted, public 
respectability upset or the value of humaneness negated. 
The human legal intuition should, however, not be confused 
with the instinctive animalistic sense shared by animals. 
3.2 Reformed views on the obligating nature  
 of natural law
The natural law teachings of the magisterial Reformers were 
by and large in agreement with the Thomistic approach to 
natural law and its obligating authority. John McNeill observes 
that the subject of natural law was not a source of controversy 
between the Scholastic tradition and the Reformers 
(McNeill, 1946:168-182; also 1941:211-227). Neither does there 
seem to be a difference in opinion between the Scholastic views 
obeyed (TO). References to WA are to the standard edition of Luther’s 
Werke (1883-1987).
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on the one hand and Luther’s and Calvin’s views on the other 
regarding a natural law theory grounded in divine providence, 
in terms of which man’s deep intellect (heart or conscience) 
reflects the fundamental moral principles (albeit dimmed by 
sin) providing human beings with the potential to be drawn 
into the pattern of God’s wisdom and thereby making them 
collaborators to establish justice in the world (Raath, 2007: 420). 
To both Luther and Calvin, man’s innermost being contains 
“remnants” or “sparks” of divine justice. In his commentary on 
St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans, Luther teaches that natural law 
is inscribed in the hearts of human beings by the Holy Spirit. 
Natural law is nothing but the divine law instilled in man’s heart 
as a result of God’s creational work and divine righteousness 
(Raath, 2007: 41). God’s righteousness, reflected in the precepts 
of natural law, serves the purpose of ensuring that the world 
may be stable and that an orderly and peaceful life may be 
ensured and justice be preserved (LW, 13:369 (LP) Psalm 112)). 
To Luther natural law is, in principle, accessible to reason 
(LW, 45:129 (TO)), and because of the central function of man’s 
reason in gaining knowledge of natural law, even the Gentiles 
have a rational knowledge of the precepts of natural law 
(LW, 22:150 (SJ), John 1). Through the Holy Spirit, man’s 
rudimentary knowledge of natural law is enlightened 
(LW 46:242 (SCS); WA 11:280 (Predigten und Schriften, 1523); 
17(2):91 (Fastenpostille, 1525); 30(2):562 (Schriften, 1529/30)). 
John Calvin also discursed extensively on the nature 
and functions of natural law (Schreiner, 2001:77). In his 
Institutes, Calvin alludes to natural law as the “inward law” 
(lex illa interior) engraved (impressam) “upon the hearts of all”, 
and in his comments on Romans 2:14-15, he states that the 
Gentiles also, “beyond doubt” have certain conceptions of 
justice and rectitude which are naturally inborn (naturalites 
ingenita) in the minds of men (Schreiner, 2001:77). 
The Swiss Reformer Heinrich Bullinger’s conception of 
natural law is typical of the Reformed natural law theories of 
the sixteenth century. In his Decades (1549 [2004]) Bullinger 
describes the law of nature as the instruction of the conscience, 
and, as it were, a certain direction placed by God Himself in 
the minds and hearts of men, to teach them what they have 
to do and what to eschew (Bullinger, 2004: II, I, 194). The law 
of nature is not called the law of nature, because in the nature 
and disposition of man there is of or by itself that reason of 
light exhorting to the best things, “and that holy working”; 
“but for because God hath imprinted or engraven in our minds 
some knowledge, and certain general principles of religion, 
justice, and goodness, which because they be grafted in us and 
born together with us, do hereby seem to be naturally in us” 
(Bullinger, 2004: II, I, 194). 
With reliance on Romans 2: 14-16 Bullinger, in line with the 
medieval natural law theorists, argues that even the Gentiles 
have the law by nature, for they have in themselves the law of 
nature, the knowledge of which is imprinted by God in their 
nature, so that they may understand what is good and what is 
evil, what is to be desired and what is to be shunned. By these 
words of the apostle we do understand that the law of nature is 
set against the written law of God (Bullinger, 2004: II, I, 195). 
The origin of the law of nature is not the corrupt disposition 
of mankind, but of God Himself, “who with his finger writeth 
in our hearts, fasteneth in our nature, and planteth in us a rule 
to know justice, equity, and goodness” (Bullinger, 2004: II, I, 
195). The law of nature – as a reflection of the divine moral law – 
instructs the conscience, and either accuses and condemns the 
evil committed or absolves and acquits, if nothing is committed 
contrary to the law: “because this conscience only and alone is 
instead of a thousand witnesses” (Bullinger, II, I, 195). 
The tenets of natural law are twofold: firstly, acknowledge 
God and worship Him; secondly, keep and maintain society 
and friendship among men. The first teaches that there is 
a God Who is to be acknowledged and reverently worshipped; 
the second entails that whatsoever we would that humans 
should do to us, we should also do to them, or: live honestly, 
do not hurt others, give every man his own; provide things 
necessary for life, and keep it from distress (Bullinger, 2004: 
II, I, 196-197).
Although natural law obliges on its own because of its authority 
as the light of reason, the consent, the will, and ability to fulfil 
the law must of necessity be given of God. Therefore, nature 
without grace is of no effect because the law of nature is not 
grafted in man by God with the intention that it should work 
man’s salvation without grace and Christ; natural law teaches 
us what is good and what is evil to convince us of our sins and 
to place us without excuse before God (Bullinger, 2004: 206).
3.3 Natural law and the covenant of creation  
 in sixteenth-century Reformed thought
Reformed theology of the sixteenth century experienced 
an upsurge in applications of the doctrine of the covenant. 
Covenantal views of first-generation reformers, among whom 
Heinrich Bullinger (1504-1575) was the most prominent and 
well-known in England, applied the idea of the covenant to both 
theological and political issues. In addition to distinguishing 
covenants of works and grace, Palatinate, English and Scottish 
theologians in the second half of the sixteenth century 
referred to a creation covenant established by God with creation 
(Visser, 1996: 444). Although it is difficult to trace the origin 
of the term in the writings of the late sixteenth century, by the 
end of the century it had become a commonplace in Reformed 
theology (Visser, 1996: 442-445). Prominent Reformed 
theologians including Caspar Oleveanus (1536-1587), Zachary 
Ursinus (1534-1587), William Ames (1576-1633), Robert Rollock 
(1555-1599), John Cameron (1579-1625), John Ball (1585-1640), 
Francis Turretin (1623-1687) and Edward Leigh (1602-1671) 
apply the term in their theological writings. 
William Ames (1576-1633), a student of William Perkins 
(1558-1602), in his Medulla Theologica (1623), teaches a covenant 
of works with Adam. To this he adds a positive command to the 
law of nature, involving a promise of continuing of animal life, 
a later “exaltation to spiritual life” and a threat of bodily death. 
Ames describes this as the law of God or His covenant with man 
in creation: “Do this and you will live; if you do not you shall die” 
(1983: 113). Since man is less perfect than the angels and needs 
more instruction and practice, something positive was added to 
the law of nature. Because man in his animal life understands 
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by the senses and is led by the hand, as it were, from sensible 
to intelligible and spiritual things, outward symbols and 
sacraments were added to the spiritual law to illustrate and 
confirm it. These symbols contained a special and positive law, 
a profession of general obedience to the law of nature put in 
man before, and a solemn confirmation of promises and threats 
as sanctions (1983: 112-113). 
In Britain Robert Rollock (1555-1599), in his Tractatus de 
vocatione efficai (1597) distinguishes a pre-lapsarian covenant 
with Adam. He grounds the covenant of works (which may be 
called legal or natural) in nature, which was pure and holy, and 
in the law of God, which was in the first creation engraved in 
man’s heart (Rollock, 1603: 6-7). After God had created man 
after His own image, pure and holy, and had written His law 
in his mind, He concluded a covenant with man. The terms of 
this covenant were that God promised man eternal life upon 
the condition of good and holy works which should correspond 
to the holiness and goodness of their creation and conform 
to His law. God concluded this covenant of works amicably 
with man, for in the creation man was God’s friend and not 
his enemy. “The thing promised in the covenant is life eternal, 
first, not righteousness: for that man in creation was even then 
just and perfect” (Rollock, 1603: 7). To the question of whether 
in the first creation good works in the covenant of works 
were required of man as meritorious for the promised life, he 
answers that they were not. Good works were due in creation 
as pledges of thankfulness in man to his creator, to glorify God. 
Rollock adds that although the covenant of works is abolished, 
and of no effect regarding justification and salvation, the moral 
law remains as a rule of life for the believer: “So then the law 
has ceased, as it was the rule of the works of nature required in 
the covenant of grace: but it is still in use to them which are in 
Christ, as it is the rule of the works of grace” (Rollock, 1603: 10).
Edward Leigh (1602-1671), in his work A treatise of Divine promises 
(1633), distinguishes a legal and an evangelical covenant. The 
former he calls a covenant of nature and a covenant of works. 
Leigh teaches that the foundation of the covenant of nature 
is the creation of man and the integrity of human nature 
(Leigh, 1633: 68). The two sacraments of this covenant were the 
Tree of Knowledge, respecting the Law, do this, and the Tree of 
Life respecting the promise, Live (Leigh, 1633: 64). 
Caspar Oleveanus (1536-1587) gives the clearest expression 
of the covenant of nature. In his De substantia he emphasises 
human responsibility under the covenant of creation. 
In Oleveanus’ covenant theology, human conscience and the 
relationship in Paradise between God and humanity find their 
culmination in the covenant of creation (cf. Ward, 2003: 54). The 
foedus creationis appears to be a foedus natural because it was 
a relationship in which Adam and Eve by nature were bearers of 
the divine image and conformed to their Creator (Bierma, 1996: 
114).5 This covenantal relationship carries responsibilities for 
man. God had revealed Himself to Adam in His image and in 
His handiwork. In return God expects man to pledge to Him 
full allegiance, honour and glory (Olevianus, 1585: 251). Adam 
5 For explicit references to ius creationis cf. Olevianus, 1578(a): 40; 
1578(b): 30; 1585: 9. 
received God’s favour through the divine image with the gifts 
of knowledge, righteousness and holiness – all on condition of 
obedience (Olevianus, 1585: 79, 80). The foedus creationis is a 
ius creationis, entailing an obligation to the Creator by man as 
creature (Olevianus, 1578(a): 75-76). The relationship of human 
conformity and obligation to God is witnessed by the law of 
nature (or natural law) (lex naturae, ius naturae, vox naturae, 
ius divinum, ius De natural), that is His holy will implanted in 
human nature, written in the heart of man, and inscribed 
in the human mind (Olevianus, 1585: 151). God’s natural 
knowledge was manifested as a natural knowledge (notitia) of 
God concerning divine holiness and hatred of sin (Olevianus, 
1578(b): 64-65). At creation the law of nature manifested itself 
in the divine image; as an expression of God’s will, it was an 
expression of His righteousness and holiness represented in 
His image. Conformity to God’s image, was also conformity to 
His will (Olevianus, 1585: 207).
The lex naturae is located in the human conscience as the place 
in which the law of nature holds its court (Graafland, 1994: 
 51-52; Bierma, 1996: 115). The conscience (as the notitia Dei) 
impels humans to the good and judges that which is wicked 
(Bierma, 1996: 116). The law of nature testifies to our obligation 
in and by the ius creationis, although it is not the covenant 
relationship itself (Bierma, 1996: 116). In the Fall of mankind 
the covenant of creation between God and man was destroyed, 
accompanied by a loss of the divine image in man. However, 
man’s debt to God was not cancelled (Olevianus, 1585: 251). By 
the ius creationis (the law of creation) man, as a sinner, is still 
bound to obey God. Through the Fall, the law of nature in the 
human constitution was weakened, but not completely erased. 
Sparks of the knowledge of God remain. Man’s naturalis sensus 
in the human conscience still teaches that God hates sin and 
will exact punishment for it. Only through Christ’s atonement 
can the clamour of the law in the conscience be silenced 
(Olevianus, 1585: 195-196, 298, 269-270). 
4 COVENANT, CONSCIENCE AND 
NATURAL LAW IN SAMUEL 
RUTHERFORD’S LEX, REX
4.1 Covenant and nature in Rutherford’s  
 theology
In his Covenant of life opened, or, a treatise of the covenant of grace 
(1655), Rutherford describes the law and covenant of works as a 
rule of everlasting righteousness, containing precepts of the law 
of nature that are intrinsically good, such as to know, love, fear, 
and trust in him as the only true God: “and in this sense it is an 
eternall Covenant” (Rutherford, 1655: 214). These are the same 
principles inscribed originally upon the heart of Adam at his 
creation, now distorted and dim because of sin, yet still present 
to some extent within all human beings (Marshall, 1995: 17). 
However, all human beings are sufficiently enlightened to know 
God and obey the law of creation. Rutherford equates the law of 
creation with the moral law, as the embodiment of the covenant 
of creation. The conscience is the treasure house containing the 
principles of natural law: “Of this intellectual Treasure-house, 
wee are to know these. That in the inner Cabinet, the naturall 
habit of Morall principles lodgeth, the Register of the common 
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notions left in us by nature, the Ancient Records and Chronicles 
which were in Adam’s time, the Law of Nature of two volumes, 
one of the first Table, that there is a God, that he createth and 
governeth all things, that there is but one God, infinitely good, 
most just rewarding the Evill and the good; and of the second 
Table, as to love Parents, obey Superiours, to hurt no man, the 
acts of humanity; All these are written in the soule, in deep 
letters, yet the Inke is dimme and old, and therefore this light is 
like the Moone swimming through watery clouds, often under 
a shadow, and yet still in the firmament. Caligula, and others, 
under a cloud, denyed there was any God, yet when the cloud 
was over, the light broke out of prison, and granted, a God there 
must be; strong winds doe blow out a Torch in the night, and 
will blow in the same light againe” (Rutherford, 1649: 7). 
Rutherford’s deliberate attempt to understand the whole of 
nature and all ethical laws from the perspective of the Biblical 
doctrine of the covenant and to apply them to the political 
life in the state must be regarded as a unique contribution 
to the Reformed theory of law and politics. God’s covenant 
with nature involves a legal principle by which the whole of 
creation tends to obey God. In human nature these principles 
are manifested as precepts of the Decalogue engraved on the 
heart of man simultaneously with his creation before they 
were announced by Moses. These precepts constitute the law 
of nature, the original covenant of creation. Because of man’s 
total depravity as a consequence of the Fall, the law of God 
can only be recognised through the working of the Holy Spirit 
(Rutherford, 1655: 19). 
In Rutherford’s Lex, Rex, the covenant of creation becomes 
a powerful paradigm for explaining God’s providential 
government of creation to bring the elect to salvation and to 
improve man’s temporal existence in society. Essentially, the 
law of nature is an instrument in God’s providential government 
of the world to preserve the human race. All living creatures 
– man in particular – have the natural inclination to preserve 
themselves, therefore the law of nature could be reduced to the 
law of self-preservation (Marshall, 1995: 263). For the proper 
understanding of nature, the divine authority of Scripture is 
required – grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. The 
close bond between, on the one hand, covenant and nature 
and, on the other, divine and natural law, brings Rutherford 
within the context of the natural law theories of the magisterial 
Reformers, notably Bullinger’s perspectives that the law of 
nature is not the written law but the law grafted in man; to teach 
and direct man, to distinguish between good and evil; it is from 
God himself, who with his finger writes in our hearts, fastens in 
our nature, and plants in us a rule to know justice, equity, and 
goodness (Bullinger, 2004: II, I: 195; Marshall, 1995: 264). 
By viewing natural law from a covenantal perspective, 
Rutherford underscores the insufficiency of natural law as an 
independent source of moral norms, isolated from scripture. 
Although nature reveals the law of God, it is insufficient as 
an autonomous source of ethical truths. Because of human 
rebellion and breaking the covenant of nature, natural law 
needs Scripture to adequately understand God’s will for 
mankind (Marshall, 1995: 265). Marshall comments as follows 
upon man’s natural awareness of the precepts of the Decalogue 
as a covenant-consciousness: “Rutherford could speak of the 
existence of natural law because, for him, all of nature was 
revelatory of God’s covenant-making character, and thus of his 
ethical will. For him, all of nature revealed the reality of God, 
and God revealed himself in all of nature. Therefore he could 
appeal to nature within the covenant framework because he 
knew it would resonate as truth in every heart” (Marshall, 
1995: 266).  
4.2 The political implications of  Rutherford’s  
 views on the covenant of nature and  
 natural law
4.2.1  Primary and secondary causation
The creational bond between God and the whole human race 
impacts strongly on the political duties of rulers and subjects 
in the commonwealth. This bond takes the form of a covenant 
regulating their relationship by the law of God. Due to the 
political covenant under the law of God (divine and natural), 
it is contrary to the Word of God for a king to hold absolute 
power and thus have freedom to be a tyrant and destroyer of his 
people (LR, Q 14: 54-62). Rutherford’s covenantal view of human 
beings and nature has important consequences. Not only does 
he explain man’s knowledge of natural law principles from 
this paradigm but also man’s ability to recognise fundamental 
covenantal principles for life in civil society. When God 
created Adam He engraved the law of the image of God, the 
natural knowledge of God, His holiness, justice, mercy, and 
knowledge of right and wrong, and a natural holiness and 
innate conformity of the heart to the eternal divine law in the 
human soul (Rutherford, 1659: 139). This is the natural law, the 
law of the image of God accompanying the covenant of creation 
(Rutherford, 1655: 214). In addition man was empowered to 
recognise covenant principles for life in society; among them 
being the deeply embedded recognition that there is a mutual 
obligation to live in society – an obligation that involves the 
need of government. This “covenant natural” precedes the 
“covenant politic (civil)” (Rutherford, 1659: 26; LR, Q 14: 54-62). 
The implications of the civil (or political) covenant for political 
life in the commonwealth are profound. For purposes of this 
essay two important consequences are briefly discussed: 
human agency is the providential means of God designed 
for political life in society and the limits to the powers of 
rulers emanating from nature. Human agency and the role of 
secondary causation form an important part of Rutherford’s 
discourse on divine providence and human responsibility in 
society.  Liberty and safety constitute two fundamental natural 
law principles. Because liberty is natural to all people it cannot 
be totally surrendered to rulers. Rutherford emphasises that 
rulers do not receive their authority directly from God, as some 
Old Testamentary examples show. In later times God works 
through means and instruments and provides human beings 
in society with an instinct of reason to appoint rulers over 
themselves (LR, Q 3: 3, 4, 5; Q 4: 6; Q 5: 12). Political authority, 
therefore, comes only “mediately” from God, proceeding from 
God by the mediation of the consent of a community, which 
transfers their power to one or more rulers (LR, Q 2: 2; Q 22: 
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99-106).6 Sovereign power is always held as a sort of power in 
trust, loaned to a ruler, who acts as “a life-renter, not a lord, 
or proprietor of his kingdom” (LR, Q 19: 86). Furthermore the 
true purpose of government revealed by God in Scripture and 
through the laws of nature and human reason is also opposed 
to absolute power wielded by political rulers. Citing St. Paul, 1st 
Timothy 2:2, Rutherford holds that God’s purpose in instituting 
civil laws and government is to ensure the external peace, 
honesty, quiet life and godliness of His church and people. 
God, the omniscient and omnipotent source of all power, has 
appointed sufficient means for this divine objective, but no 
sufficient means could exist if one man were to have an absolute 
unlimited power to subordinate justice to his own arbitrary 
will, creating a state of insecurity and confusion (LR, Q 19: 87). 
4.2.2  Limitations to the ruler’s powers
The natural law principle salus populi suprema lex has an 
important bearing upon the principle of the mediate ordination 
of rulers by the people’s consent (LR, Q 25: 119-125). Since the 
people are, under God, the first author of both the fundamental 
laws of the country and of the monarchy, their safety is the 
principal end which must be sought (LR, Q 25: 119). This end 
will be better accomplished by the ruler through limited powers 
aided by subordinate magistrates than with absolute power put 
into his hands. Because of human sinfulness, the possession 
of exorbitant powers has an intoxicating influence liable 
to abuse (LR, Q14: 54-62). The safety of the people serves as 
a fundamental legal axiom which limits all human laws in both 
content and execution (application) (Webb, 1964: 98). Because 
rulers are rulers according to the law, and not as rulers of the law, 
they do not have the power to interpret and apply the laws of 
the commonwealth as they please. Rutherford cites the biblical 
example of King Saul’s “exponing the law after a tyrannical way, 
against the intent of the law, which is the diamond and pearl of 
all laws – the safety of the innocent people, was justly resisted 
by the innocent people, who violently hindered innocent 
Jonathan to be killed” (LR, Q 27: 137). The royalist assumption 
that absolute power is acceptable is precluded because it is 
against nature for the people to have, and give away, a power 
to destroy themselves either physically or spiritually. Because 
rulers are bound to the duty to be loving fathers, guides and 
protectors of the people, they cannot act as bloody conquerors 
whose actions are a denial of all the good qualities which 
ought to be found in a ruler. Even if a conqueror were to force 
a defeated people to submit to his rule, he could not thereby 
become a lawful monarch. Consent given under extremes is 
not valid and people, or their posterity, are entitled to vindicate 
their own liberty given away unjustly. Although evil and unjust 
causes might appear to triumph for a time, this is no indication 
of God’s approval (LR, Q 10: 39-45).
Rutherford emphasises that a community is entitled to resume 
the power conferred on its ruler. A community in itself, even 
without rulers, is still a body politic (or civil society) because it 
has the ability to constitute or consent to government (LR, Q 7: 
22-28). In terms of Romans 13, abused power cannot be regarded 
6 A view originally expressed in Christopher Goodman’s How superior 
powers ought to be obeyed (1558). 
as God’s ordinance. Rutherford draws a distinction between the 
power of the ruler personally and the lawful power vested in his 
office. Although subjection to political authority is required by 
the fifth commandment and by Romans 13, these texts do not 
disallow resistance to an individual king who sinfully exceeds 
or abuses his royal authority. Quoting Knox’s History of the 
Reformation in Scotland as authority, Rutherford distinguishes 
between the authority which is God’s ordinance, and the 
person placed in authority as a human being, sinful, fallible 
and liable to offend (LR, Q 29: 146). Since self-preservation is an 
individual’s natural right, it is surely natural to the nation also. 
Therefore, the English and Scottish parliaments were entitled 
to resist the king’s personal will. Rutherford quotes Henry 
Parker’s Observations upon some of his Majesties late answers and 
expresses (1642) in support of the king not serving as a father to 
the community but rather acting as a “son to them, and they his 
maker” (LR, Q 25: 123). Although the king had executive power 
over his people, he was still their inferior, since they had the 
“fountain power” which made him king. The people gave the 
king a political power for their own safety but retained a natural 
power of self-preservation. In tyrannical acts inconsistent with 
the fiduciary trust placed in him he was accountable to the 
parliament which represented the people (LR, Q 19: 77-88). 
4.2.3  The impact of Rutherford’s natural law  
 covenantalism on Puritan political theory
Rutherford’s expounding of the covenantal natural law 
foundations of political society found support in a number of 
influential Puritan political works. James Stewart of Goodtrees 
(1635-1713), a future Lord Advocate of Scotland, found support 
in Rutherford’s Lex, Rex, for justifying the Pentland Rising of 
1666. Stewart adapted Rutherford’s ideas to the circumstances 
of Restoration Scotland by allowing resistance by the people 
without the sanction of Parliament. Stewart asked why a 
considerable part of the nation should not defend their lives, 
estates, liberties and religion against sanguinary soldiers, when 
all legal means of redress had been denied them (cf. Maltzahn, 
1998: 232-234). From the angle of the individual’s right of 
self-defence, the people’s right was vindicated when all doors 
of hope were closed and, moreover, the whole community 
was bound by solemn vows and covenants (Stewart, 1669: 
14-15, 23-27). 
With copious references to Lex, Rex, Stewart maintains that 
prior to any government each man governed his own affairs 
in the state of nature, “having no other law to square his 
actions by, than the moral law, or the law of nature”. In this 
condition nobody had more right than anyone else to exercise 
civil authority. Although parents had authority over children, 
husbands over wives, and masters over servants, these forms 
of dominion entitled no one to political authority. Arguing 
from the principle of self-preservation, Stewart remarks that 
if it were assumed that people acted rationally at the setting 
up of rulers, it could never be claimed that they surrendered 
their right of self-defence, particularly in circumstances where 
rulers acted as open enemies. Because the right of self-defence 
is natural and inalienable, the transfer of political power from 
the people was to designate the person, persons, or dynasty 
to rule, in the form of government chosen by the people 
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(Stewart, 1669: 80-91). Because the ruler’s power is merely 
a fiduciary power, such as the power of a tutor or patron “created 
of the people that he might defend them from injuries and 
oppressions ... he hath no more power than of a Tutor, publick 
servant, or Watchman” (Stewart, 1669: 147-149).
Stewart traces the origin of the relationship between ruler 
and people to a real compact, either explicit or implicit, that 
a particular person be appointed as sovereign. In addition 
there must be some conditions upon which this mutual 
compact is based, for a compact cannot be without conditions 
(Stewart, 1669: 96-98). If the king neglects, or exceeds, his duty, 
the people have a right to redress, which exists in all mutual 
compacts. By virtue of the mutual compact, the people have 
a right in law to pursue him for performance (Stewart, 1669: 
112, 115-117, 150-152). Stewart follows Rutherford in maintaining 
that the Scottish monarchy had been founded by consent, not 
conquest as alleged in James VI and James I’s The trew law of free 
monarchies (Stewart, 1669: 92-94, 119-124, 144-146). 
In Naphtali (1667), a work co-authored by James Sterling, 
and also relying on Lex, Rex, Stewart voices the principle that 
whatever form of government is set up by the people under God, 
the people remain ultimately superior to the supreme power 
(Stewart & Stirling, 1667: 118). When government is “manifestly 
and notoriously” perverted people may enter into new societies 
for their defence and preservation (Stewart & Stirling, 1667: 
177-181). In x it is stated that “as all Societies, Governments, 
and Lawes are appointed in due Subordination to God and 
His superior Will and Law, for His Glory and the Common 
Good of the People, including the safety of every individual” 
(Stewart & Stirling, 1667: 240); so, “if either this Subordination 
be notoriously infringed, or these Ends intolerably perverted, 
the common tie of both Society, Government and Law, is so far 
dissolved. Hence is it that a King or Rulers commanding things 
directly contrary to the Law of God, may be, and have been 
justly disobeyed, and by fury or folly destroying or alienating 
the Kingdome, may be and have been lawfully resisted” (Stewart 
& Stirling, 1667: 240). The authors continue: “That through 
the manifest and notorious Perversion of the great Ends of 
Society and Government, the Bond thereof being dissolved, the 
persons, one or more thus liberated therefore, do relapse into 
their primeve Liberty and Priviledge, and accordingly as the 
similitude of their case and exigence of their cause doth require, 
may upon the very same principles again join and associate for 
their better Defence and Preservation, as they did at first enter 
into Societies” (Stewart & Stirling, 1667: 242-243).
Alexander Shield’s (1660-1700) A hind let loose, based on ideas of 
Knox, Buchanan and Rutherford, published in 1687, maintains 
that the moral power is lawful authority; it is the power ordained 
of God as described in Romans 13, and conveyed by the people to 
king and parliament. Government is from God, but He does not 
determine by any special revelation who the rulers in a specific 
commonwealth shall be. God therefore makes provision for 
political authority by mediation of human beings, giving 
them rules how they shall proceed in setting up government, 
and by the law of nature He has enjoined government to be, 
but has not ordered the particulars of it, because God has 
committed it to the positive transactions of human beings 
(Shields, 1797: 335-338, 364, 328, 303-304, 390). If government 
is destructive to the ends of the glory of God and the good of 
mankind, the people are released from their obligation to 
government. The compact between the ruler and the people 
is transacted in the ruler’s admission to the government, in 
which the law of God regulates both parties. The ruler’s power is 
a trust for which he is accountable to the people (Shields, 1797: 
351-352, 354, 388, 340). 
CONCLUSIONS
Rutherford’s covenantal natural law theory marks a distinct 
shift from the Thomistic natural law view. Rutherford’s 
argument from natural law is based on the obligatory nature 
of divine law: government is ordained by God and this obliges 
the citizens of the state to obey. This brings a distinct shift from 
Aquinas’ natural law theory with respect to nature. For Aquinas 
“natural” entails the state of affairs which usually happens or 
is expected to happen (Flinn, 1978-1979: 56). Through natural 
reason man can discover what is expected to happen. Because 
human beings naturally congregate together to protect 
themselves by government, Aquinas deduces that it follows 
that humans ought to do so. However, as Flinn rightly indicates, 
Aquinas and other natural law theorists err by furthering the 
“naturalistic fallacy”; just because something is a certain way, 
does not establish that it should be that way. Flinn observes: 
“You cannot reason from the is to the ought on rationalistic 
or autonomous grounds.” Rutherford effectively avoids this 
fallacy by beginning with positive, divine law as revealed in the 
Scripture. Furthermore he does not draw the conclusion from 
the natural creation order which is normally drawn by natural 
law theorists. He argues that civil society is natural only insofar 
as God has created man a social creature. Civil society, therefore, 
is natural in its root, but as to its mode (or manner) it is entirely 
voluntary. Therefore, when men choose to defend themselves 
by handing power and authority to another that is not natural, 
for men are not born to live in subjection to each other. Rather, 
when men devolve power on to a particular official, it is 
a positive moral action, not a natural one (Flinn, 1978-1979: 57).  
Rutherford’s Biblical interpretation of the creation covenant 
and the covenantal natural law distinguishes between the 
institution of civil government and its form or expression 
in any particular time. Because God has directly instituted 
government, and its exercise of justice, it must be governed 
by God immediately. However, the particular method or form 
which civil government may take can vary, for here God works 
through secondary means – that is through the people who are 
governed. Although forms of government may change, the 
root and basis of government remain immutable. The people 
are obliged to obey governments, because they are ordained 
by God’s law. This, according to Rutherford, is the foundation 
of civil government. But, as to whether citizens should submit 
to a particular civil government, or whether they should have 
this man or that to govern them, is another issue. It is here 
that the conditional consent and choice of the people become 
important. 
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